La Constitución de la República Federal del Brasil de 1988 estableció un conjunto de competencias privativas del Tribunal Supremo Federal para ejercer el control jurisdiccional. Consagra un tribunal competente para decidir las acciones abstractas de inconstitucionalidad contra la mayoría de las disposiciones legales, independientemente de las situaciones específicas a las que se aplican. Este sistema concentrado de control jurisdiccional coexiste con la simultaneidad de los dos modelos tradicionales. El artículo desarrolla la ideología judicial que domina el discurso de la Corte Suprema el cual se mantiene fiel a la imagen de Kelsen de ser un "legislador negativo".
Constitutional Courts as "negative Legislators": The Brazilian Case
Prior to the Constitution of 1988, the Brazilian system of judicial review was closer to the American tradition of judicial review than to the Austrian model developed by Hans Kelsen, which concentrates the jurisdiction on constitutional matters in a single Constitutional Court. The declaration of unconstitutionality was merely a step to be followed by any ordinary the judge in the justification of her decision. Even though a dispute over the constitutionality of an Act could eventually reach the high courts by means of an appeal, there was no warranty that this would ever happen.
Although there was an abstract action for assessing the constitutionality of statutes before the Federal Supreme Court, the scope of this action was very strict and only the General-Attorney of the Republic (who was at the same time the Procurator of the Federal Government and the Chief of the Public Ministry) was empowered to bring it before the Supreme Court. In a legal system where the General-Attorney of the Republic was directly subordinated to the President of the Republic and where the Executive Administration was authorized to legislate in place of the Congress in a wide range of areas, like Brazil was at the time of the Military Dictatorships of the three decades which antedated the Constitution of 1988, that sort of action was of 3 very little utility.
These brief historical considerations help one understand the roots of the current Brazilian system of constitutional jurisdiction. They explain, for instance, the fact that any judge in the country is competent to decide a constitutional issue. The general competence to adjudicate on constitutional issues has its origins in such historical tradition. Nonetheless, the Constitution of 1988, in spite of keeping the incidental system of judicial review, was deliberately designed to break down with this tradition. The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 is partly inspired by the Kelsenian ideas that a decision which pronounces the unconstitutionality is not declaratory, but rather constitutive; that there can be no "unconstitutional" statute in the sense of a null and void piece of legislation, but only a statute "contrary to the Constitution" which can be derogated by the Constitutional Courts through a special procedure that is different from ordinary legislation; and that as a general rule the Constitutional Court pronounces erga omnes decisions creating a derogatory rule which eliminates a previous norm incompatible with the Constitution (in such a way that the court is a negative legislator). These ideas have a deep influence in the institutional settings of the Brazilian state and the doctrines about the relationship between the Legislative and the Justiciary.
The Constitution of 1988, although without naming the Federal Supreme Court a "Constitutional Court", placed that court in a special position and established a set of privative competences to exercise the judicial review. The court is now competent to decide abstract actions of unconstitutionality against most statutory provisions, regardless of any specific situations to which they are applied. Such direct actions can be brought before the court by a relatively vast group of entities which represent general sectors of the society.
This concentrated system of judicial review coexists with the historical model of incidental and diffused constitutional adjudication. The simultaneity of the two traditional models is one of the distinctive features of the Brazilian system of judicial review. Even though the judicial ideology that dominates the discourse of the Supreme Court remains faithful to Kelsen's image of the Constitutional Court as no more than a "negative legislator", our analysis will show that there are occasions in which it effectively acts as a positive law-making agency, albeit strictly bound to the constitution and sensitive to its judicial 3 In the previous Brazilian Constitution there was no distinction between the General Attorney of the Republic and the General-Advocate of the Union. The separation between the Public Ministry (headed by the former) and the General Advocacy of the Union (headed by the latter) is one of the Union important changes in the institutional setting of the republic undertaken by the novel Constitution. By means of this distinction, the "public interest" is differentiated from the "interest of the Government" not merely from a rhetorical point of view. The Constitution has created a legal office subordinate to the President the competence of which is to defend the interests of the Federal Government and an autonomous office the competence of which is to protect the rule of law, the public estates, the fundamental legal rights and other collective or "diffused rights" such as the protection of the environment. For a brief comment on the Public Ministry after the Constitution of 1988, see infra, note 12. Thomas Bustamante y Evanilda de Godoi Bustamante role. In fact, one can easily agree that the Brazilian Constitution expressly requires the Court to lay down general and abstract norms which sometimes are hierarchically ranked in the same level of the ordinary legislation. In order to justify this assertion, we will analyse the Brazilian system of judicial review by separating the incidental and diffused review from the abstract and concentrated one.
THE DIFFUSED AND INCIDENTAL SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The model of incidental and concrete judicial review remains applicable in Brazil and constitutes one of the central features of the Brazilian legal tradition. It is a concrete form of judicial review because the unconstitutionality of a norm (no matter where it can find its sources: in a statute, in an international treaty, in an administrative decree, in a conventional norm within a contract etc.) is argued by one of the parties in the course of an ordinary legal dispute. As opposed to most European countries which have a Constitutional Court, the judge must decide the constitutional issue herself. The decision about the (un)constitutionality of the norms is a necessary step that the judge has to take before reaching her conclusion. Further to being a concrete system of judicial review, this is also a system of diffused judicial review because the constitutional jurisdiction is spread out through the court system. Every court in Brazil has constitutional jurisdiction. When the unconstitutionality is argued before a firstinstance judge, there is no need for any special formalities, except for giving the other party the chance to counter the arguments advanced for the declaration of unconstitutionality. The Constitutional Court does not have a say on the issue unless the case reaches it by an extraordinary appeal that only is admissible after a final second-instance decision is pronounced.
When the unconstitutionality is argued before a court of appeal or any other highcourt, the constitutional issue can only be decided in a plenary session of the court. When there is no binding precedent applicable to a case, there is no procedural mechanism enabling a party or a judge to submit the constitutional issue to the Supreme Court before a decision is reached in the ordinary courts. Apart from exceptional cases which will be dealt with later in this report, the technique of avocamiento, which is admitted in 4 da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 97. Constituição some Latin American countries, does not find an equivalent in Brazil. Only final decisions from the ordinary courts can be challenged by an "extraordinary appeal" (recurso extraordinario) to the Federal Supreme Court. These extraordinary appeals are admitted to decide constitutional controversies. They can neither re-examine the evidence or any question of fact nor adjudicate on a question of interpretation of infra-constitutional laws.
The issue of the unconstitutionality of any statute, international treaty, legislative decree or administrative resolution which establishes a general norm can be brought before the Supreme Court via a recurso extraordinario, although there are some procedural barriers aimed at filtering the 5 number of appeals to the Federal Supreme Court.
The amount of discretion of the court in choosing the appeals it will decide is relatively low. Until relatively recently there was nearly no discretion (all the cases which fulfill all procedural requirements where submitted to the court), but a recent Constitutional Amendment has determined that only cases of "general repercussion" (repercussão 6 geral) can be submitted to the court. The basic idea is that only cases which reflect upon the status of positive law in a relevant way should be decided by the court. The main purpose of the appeals to the Supreme Court is not to protect individual situations, but rather to unify the interpretation of valid law. To decide whether or not an issue is of "general repercussion" it is necessary a judgment of the plenary session of the Federal Supreme Court (which is constituted by eleven Ministers). It is in the case law of the Court that one will find the criteria for identifying such cases. Nevertheless, once a party demonstrates that her case fits the constitutional definition of a case of "general repercussion", she has a constitutional right to see her case decided by the court.
As a rule, the incidental declaration of unconstitutionality of a provision or an act neither is strictly binding nor has erga omnes effect. According to the wording of the Constitution, or an incidenter tantum decision to become universally efficacious the Federal Senate must pass a resolution derogating 7 that norm. The Federal Supreme Court, when reaching a definitive decision recognizing the unconstitutionality of a legal provision, notifies the Senate, which will have discretion on whether or not the norm should be formally abrogated. Nonetheless, in spite of this constitutional provision, the practice of the Senate is to avoid eliminating particular legal provisions declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
This does not mean, however, that the final decisions of the Supreme Court are not authoritative. Even though as a rule the decisions of the courts have inter partes efficacy, constitutional precedents are of fundamental importance in the 5 Some of these requisites are established in legislation, such as the need to discuss the constitutionality of a law as an incidental question before the lower courts. It is a burden of the appellant to formulate an argument for the unconstitutionality of the normative act and to assure that the court explicitly expresses an opinion on the constitutional issues. If the court remains silent after a claim of unconstitutionality is raised by a party, it is up to this party to request a clarifying pronouncement (Embargo de Declaração) over the constitutionality of the norm within 5 days of the publication of the decision. A thesis that was not discussed by the lower courts can not reach the Supreme Court unless if that Court leaves the incidental claim of unconstitutionality undecided after being warned by the interested party (See STF: Sumula 356). This requisite seems reasonable and is quite accepted by the constitutional lawyers, although it requires some special argumentative techniques that are not always dominated by general practitioners. There are, however, serious problems which refer to other requisites that are not established in any law and that do not find any statutory justification. The court creates a filter to diminish the number of cases under its jurisdiction. In this sense, there is a chain of precedents ruling that an extraordinary appeal can not be brought before the Supreme Court in order to protect the principle of Legality (or, in other words, the rule that "no one shall be obliged to do or to refrain from something unless by order of a law" -Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 5th, II). This principle contains a prohibition for administrative authorities to create general norms other than in the situations explicitly authorized either by the Constitution or by a statute. The case law of the Supreme Court, however, created a constraint establishing that the violation of the Constitution which opens the way to an extraordinary appeal must be "direct and frontal", that is, must be assessed merely by comparing the unconstitutional act with the Constitution. There is in fact a judge-made rule stating that "extraordinary appeals are inadmissible to remediate a violation of the principle of legality whenever its verification presupposes to revise the interpretation given by the court of origin to the infra-constitutional legislation" (STF: Sumula 636). 6 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 103, § 3rd, with the wording given by the 45th Constitutional Amendment of 30th December 2004. 7 Constituição da Republica Federativa do Brasil: art. 52, X.
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Brazilian legal system. If we stick to the classification of the institutional force of judicial precedents adopted by one of the authors of this report in a previous writing, who distinguishes three categories of normativity for judicial precedents (precedents "binding in a strong sense", precedents "binding in a weak sense" and precedents "merely persuasive"), we can place this sort of case law in the intermediate category and characterize it at 8 least as "binding in a weak sense."
As we will see later in this report, there is a clear trend of increasing substantially the normative powers of the Supreme Court in the decisions of unconstitutionality, regardless of whether they are pronounced in the course of a legal dispute or in a Direct Action of Unconstitutionality.
Some signs of this trend are the recent constitutional and legislative reforms that enhanced the binding character of the decisions of the court. However, before examining these law reforms we will outline some of the aspects of the concentrated system of constitutional review.
2.
THE 17 The roots of this jurisprudence lie in a sort of Kelsenian orthodoxy. In his General Theory of Law and State, Kelsen explains the reception of ancient laws by a novel constitution in this way: "If laws which were introduced under the old constitution 'continue to be valid' under the new constitution, this is possible only because validity has expressly or tacitly been vested in them by the new constitution. (…) The new order 'receives,' i. e. adopts, norms from the old order; this means that the new order gives validity to (puts into force) norms which have the same content of the old order" (Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945, p. 117). When Kelsen holds that the new order created by a Constitution provides a new basis for the validity to norms of the old order, he appears to be denying the possibility of a conflict between an ancient law and the new constitution (since the non-received norms belong to a different legal order). One should notice, however, that Kelsen is merely providing a theoretical explanation of the creation of a new legal system, not giving any recommendation to the Constitutional Court. We have plenty of reasons to doubt that Kelsen himself would maintain that, in a legal system in which all the laws are submitted to direct forms of judicial review, the old and anachronical laws which defy the constitution should be excluded from constitutional jurisdiction. We hope that the Court finds a way out of this jurisprudence in the years to come. Meanwhile, a solution to minimize this problem can be provided by recent statutes which regulated the Claim against the Disrespect to a Fundamental Precept, which is a direct action subsidiary to the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality. This solution, however, would not eliminate the problem, since not all constitutional provisions can constitute a parameter for that claim (see below, subsection 2.1, "c"). 18 For a comment on the topic and a detailed analysis of the case law of the Supreme Court, see: Gilmar Mendes, Inocencio M. to bring an ADC.
The distinctive feature of the ADC is that its purpose is to demonstrate not the unconstitutionality of a normative act, but rather its compatibility with the Constitution. Since every court and every first instance judge has constitutional jurisdiction, sometimes the lower courts are overwhelmed with identical claims arguing against the constitutionality of a particular statutory provision. In Fiscal matters and issues related to State Pensions, the number of identical cases contesting the constitutionality of tributes or the criteria used by the Government to update state pensions can be alarming. The number of omissive ADINs in Brazil is relatively low, and the tendency is that this number drops even further. As the Constitution gets older, a smaller number of matters referred to in its text are left completely unregulated. The trend is that the court should deal more with partial omissions than 32 with complete omissions.
As it happens with the ADIN, one may bring and omissive ADIN before the court not to uphold her own right, but rather to protect the juridical order as a whole. The object of the action is the integrity of the legal order, not any specific right.
In general, the Supreme Court's case law on constitutional omissions can be classified as conservative. The court attributes heavy weight to the principle of democracy and to the principle of division of powers. The classic idea of a system of "checks and balances" recommends one to avoid any type of judicial activism when it comes to providing a remedy for unconstitutional omissions. 
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The court seems to incline itself towards the view that, in case of a complete absence of a regulation that is required by the constitution, the court should declare its unconstitutionality without pronouncing the nullity of any act and without issuing a direct order to the legislator. In this sense, the Court has held, in an omissive ADIN which intended to establish that the value of the minimum wage was unconstitutional because it could not supply for the satisfaction of the basic needs of a person, that while deciding an omissive ADIN the Supreme Court can do no more than notify the legislative body competent to remediate the omission, in order to it aware of the unconstitutionality and to enable it to regulate the matter required by the Constitution 33 without interference from the Justiciary. 49 In the speech of the Reporter Judge, the court refers to the "individual and collective rights" enumerated at article 5th, I to LXXVIII of the Constitution. An opened question is whether the social rights and the labour rights should be considered "fundamental precepts" of the Constitution.There are arguments in both directions 50 
Concentrated Constitutional Review by Concrete Claims
Further to the four types of abstract claims of unconstitutionality highlighted above, there are two special writs that are relevant for constitutional jurisdiction. 53 The writ of Mandado de Segurança antedates the Constitution of 1988 by fifty years. It was introduced by the Constitution of 1934 and its main inspiration was the Writ of Mandamus, from the Law of the United States of America. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the MS and the Writ of Injunction have similar effects (they both may lead to a court order determining or restraining one from a particular action), they can be distinguished because while the latter is a remedy within the discretion of the courts, the former is a judicial action in which the courts have no discretion in enforcing the right of the claimant. For more on the Mandado de Segurança, see: Hely Lopes Meirelles, Mandado de Seguranca, 30th edition updated by Arnoldo Wald and others, Sao Paulo: Malheiros, 2007. 54 Nevertheless, one cannot challenge the general effects of a law by an MS, for its efficacy is limited to the protection of a particular individual right. In this sense, there is an old Sumula which has been continuously applied by the court. See: STF, Sumula 266: "It is inadmissible to challenge a general law by a Mandado de Segurança" (this is not a literal translation. The canonical form of the sumula in Portuguese is: "Não cabe mandado de segurança contra lei em tese"). This sumula does not mean, however, that one can not deploy constitutional arguments in support of one's rights. As long as there is a liquid right in issue and as long as the effects of the decision do not extend beyond the individual legal relations of the case, the MS can be processed by the courts. The jurisdiction to adjudicate on a MS is determined by the territory over which the body which enacted the act challenged by the writ has authority. In case of an act of Congress, however, there is a constitutional provision attributing that competence to the Federal Supreme Court. 55 One of the distinctive features of the Mandado de Segurança is that it is a special procedure for protecting only "liquid rights." A liquid right is understood in the relevant legal statutes (especially Law number 1.533 /1951) as a right which is based on uncontroversial factual circumstances. There can be no controversy over the "facts of the case" and the claimant must have unequivocal documental evidence. The circumstance of being brought against a bill in discussion by Congress turns the MS into a sui generic direct action, since the effects of the decision, instead of being inter partes, are generalized and become erga omnes once the act is nullified. 56 Like the Omissive ADIN, the MI is a constitutional writ whose function is to break down the inertia of the legislator. The writ is admissible whenever the lack of a regulatory infra-constitutional norm "makes it impossible to exercise the civil liberties and fundamental legal rights or the prerogatives related 58 to nationality, sovereignty and citizenship."
The first leading case on the admissibility of the MI was decided merely one year after the promulgation of the Constitution of 1988. In this case (MI 107), the court held that the efficacy of a decision delivered in an MI is similar to that of an Omissive ADIN: the MI is an action which intends to obtain from the Justiciary a declaration of unconstitutionality of an omission in regulating a right, with a view of notifying the entity responsible for that regulation to take action, as it There are, however, some cases in which the court gave a broader scope to the procedural remedy of the MI. Congress passed a law listing such conditions. The Supreme Court, after holding that there was an unjustifiable legislative omission, fixed a deadline of six months for Congress to pass a law eliminating that omission. Furthermore, it determined that if no law was passed until that deadline, the claimant would be automatically entitled to claim the fiscal 64 benefit.
In these two cases, the court took a step towards judicial legislation, albeit only with inter partes effect. That step, however, was of limited significance. In both cases the Constitution is very clear about the rights that are protected by its provisions. There is no doubt about the semantic meaning of the constitutional norms and it is very easy to understand the scope of the right which is determined by the Basic Norm. The reference to ordinary legislation can mean no more than the assertion the law-maker may, within a certain margin of appreciation, restrict or extend the protection of such rights. One could even say that the MI was not really needed in those cases, on the grounds that the Constitutional provisions in issue were immediately applicable, in spite of the fact that 65 the legislator might restrict them.
c) Additive Decisions and the Writ of Injunction
In some recent decisions, the Supreme Course has made substantial changes in its case law by recognizing the possibility of additive decisions within a Writ of Injunction. In a claim (an MI) filed against the absence of a law regulating strike actions by public servants, the Court overruled in part its leading case (MI 107) concerning the limits of the judicial powers of filling in unconstitutional gaps. The Brazilian Constitution expressly contemplates among the fundamental labour rights the right to come out on strike, and has a specific provision requiring a federal law to lay down the particulars of strike actions within the public services. Nevertheless, nearly twenty years after the promulgation of the Constitution, no law had been passed regulating these matters. While the Government stated that its servants were not allowed go on strike until a statute fixing the limits and the conditions for exercising this right was enacted, the unions of workers and many leaders of labour organizations interpreted the aforementioned constitutional provision as establishing an unlimited or unconstrained right. In times of tension between the Government and its servants, the situation has reached a level where serious losses have been suffered by the population. In administrative bodies like the National Institute of Social Security, a multimonth strike has lead thousands of pensioners to suffer intolerable delays in receiving their pensions. Administrative claims of new benefits have been suspended and a large part of the population have been unable to claim benefits such as maternity leave or the allowance paid by the Government (in place of the salary) to people away from work for health reasons. As the Court held, the absence of a regulation on this issue has led to a sort of "state of nature" which has "serious consequences for the Rule of Law." As Minister Gilmar Mendes expressed in his opinion, to leave the issue unregulated would amount to a sort of "judicial omission" in protecting 66 the Constitution.
On the face of this context, the Supreme Court pronounced the first additive decision -or at least the first admittedly additive decision -in the history of its case law. As opposed to the decisions on the MI 283 and the MI 232 -where it was ruled that a Constitutional right may be directly applicable in spite of the possibility of restrictive legislation only if its content can be directly determined by the interpretation of the constitutional text -, the Court decided to make positive regulations for a situation which was leading to serious social conflicts. After analyzing in detail the practice of additive 64 STF, MI 232, Rel. Min. Moreira Alves, DJ de 27-03-1992. 65 In this sense, a prestigious part of the doctrine argues with plausible arguments that the remedy of the MI is unnecessary, since the Constitution establishes that the fundamental legal rights are immediately applicable and the methods of constitutional interpretation enable jurists to establish, in concrete cases, the sphere of applicability such rights. decisions in the Italian tradition, the Court made express reference to the works of the Portuguese Professor Rui Medeiros, who admits additive decisions integrating legislation or yet when the regulation adopted by the court is "constitutionally 67 obligatory."
The court decided thus to analogically apply the ordinary labour laws which regulate strike action in private labour contracts. Until further legislation is passed, public servants are subjected at least to the same rules that apply to ordinary workers as to the 68 abusive forms of strike action.
Nevertheless, one should not overestimate the impact of this new case in the state of the law.
Arguments by analogy are a central feature to any legal system, and there is nothing original or particular to developed forms of constitutional review. The sole distinctive feature of this type of case law is that it constitutes an analogical decision with erga omnes effects, since it establishes a rule to be generally observed until legislative acts are passed.
In spite of the general effect of its analogical decisions, the Court expressly insists that it is not acting as a "positive legislator", but merely as the 69 "guardian of the Constitution."
EFFECTS OF THE JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS

Inter partes and erga omnes decisions
The distinction between inter partes and erga omnes effects of constitutional decisions provides the key criterion to distinguish the decisions of constitutional questions in concrete cases (that is, as an incidental question within a legal dispute) and in abstract constitutional actions (that is, claims detached from any case of application of the provision challenged by direct actions).
As a rule, decisions of unconstitutionality -including the cases of "partial annulment of a legal norm without textual reduction" of a statutory provision (declaração de inconstitucionalidade parcial sem redução de texto) and the "interpretation in accordance with the Constitution" (interpretação conforme a Constituição) -pronounced in abstract or direct actions are erga omnes efficacious and have both a derogatory effect on the unconstitutional provision and a repristinatory effect on the legislation which was abrogated by 70 it. Decisions on abstract constitutional actions do not resolve concrete disputes, but rather eliminate the statutes or the provisions pronounced as "unconstitutional."
On the other hand, decisions of unconstitutionality within a legal dispute have inter partes effect and thus lack authority to derogate statutory legislation. Notwithstanding this, there is an ongoing discussion in the Supreme Court about the possibility of attributing erga omnes efficacy to incidental constitutional decisions that the Court might have adopted in concrete constitutional review. In a case in which only four of the eleven Ministers of the Federal Supreme Court have already delivered their judgments, some Ministers of the Court have argued that the system of constitutional review in Brazil has suffered a "constitutional mutation." The Constitutional provision which requires that a Resolution of the Federal Senate should be passed in order to attribute erga omnes efficacy to a 67 See, in this particular, the opinion of Minister Gilmar Mendes, which is transcribed in Gilmar Mendes et alli, op. cit. (note 16), pp. 1.214-1.219. See also, for a more developed account on the doctrine of additive decisions to which the Court adheres, Rui Medeiros, A Decisão de Inconstitucionalidade, Lisboa: Universidade Católica Editora, 1999, pp. 301-318. In our opinion, however, the directive suggested above seems to be merely that additive decisions integrating legislation are admitted while additive decisions reforming legislation are not. When a norm is considered to be "constitutionally obligatory", this seams to mean that this norm is determined by the Constitution, and therefore no additive decision is needed. 68 STF, MI 670, Rel. Min. Gilmar Mendes, DJ de 31-10-2008. 69 Ibid. 70 The pronouncement of unconstitutionality in abstract actions, in the face its repristinatory efficacy, implies the reestablishment of the norms derogated by the norm whose constitutionality is challenged by a direct action (RTJ 120/64 -RTJ 194/504-505-ADI 2.867/ES, v.g. interpretation of the Constitution.
The scope of the binding effects of the decisions of the court
One of the most controversial problems of Brazilian Constitutional Law is whether it is admissible or not to challenge, by means of a Reclamação, a judicial decision which violates not only the ruling of a binding decision of the Supreme Court, but also its "justifying reasons" (fundamentos determinantes).
In a case decided in October 2003, the Federal Supreme Court decided that the writ would be admissible in order to compel the lower courts to respect not only the concrete order which pronounces the unconstitutionality of a particular provision or establishes that it shall be interpreted in a particular sense, but also the motivation or 82 the ratio decidendi of a binding decision. Nevertheless, in spite of this decision of the plenary sitting of the court, there is still an ongoing discussion among its members over the thesis that the binding efficacy of a decision transcends the particular order laid down by the court and thus encompasses the reasoning or the general principles formulated to justify the conclusions 83 of the court. There is no objective method for determining the ratio decidendi of the decisions of the court in ADINs, ADCs and ADPFs.
One thing seems to be certain. It is very unlikely that the Court will attribute binding effects to a decision which pronounces the constitutionality of a norm even when the parties offer new reasons which were not submitted to the court in the previous judgment. If one is able to put forward arguments which were not discussed by members of the court in a previous case that pronounced the constitutionality of a rule, there is no reason to believe that this rule will be "protected" from a claim of unconstitutionality on grounds not yet analyzed by the Court. The erga omnes and binding effects of the decision are thus merely of prima facie character. A decision that holds that a law X is compatible with the Constitution for the set of reasons R can always be challenged on the basis of the reason r1 if this reason does not belong to the set R. To put it more simply, a decision which establishes the constitutionality of a legal provision is valid with a sort of clausula rebus sic stantibus, since some social changes and newer juridical understandings of the matter analyzed by the court in the past might justify a change in the court's 84 doctrine.
Interpretative and reductive decisions by the Federal Supreme Court
In the speeches of the Ministers of the Federal Supreme Court, one can find express and recurrent references to many interpretative and reductive decisions, such as the technique of "interpretation in accordance with the Constitution", the 81 In spite of being the "final interpretation" of the Constitution, the binding decisions of the Federal Supreme Court find a limit, since they cannot bind the legislator. A pronouncement of "partial unconstitutionality with textual reduction" is perhaps the most frequent of these methods. If a legislative provision, in the same paragraph or sentence, contemplates two or more alternative hypotheses, it might be the case that only one of them violates the Constitution. The unconstitutionality of the provision is partial because among the multiple facts covered by the abstract description of the norm, only a few make this norm unconstitutional. A reductive decision is one which "eliminates part of the linguisticuncontroversial core of the area of application of a 86 norm."
A pronouncement of unconstitutionality with textual reduction is thus one which eliminates some expression from the wording of a legal provision.
In an abstract formula, the pronouncements of unconstitutionality with textual reduction of a norm can be described thus: "If a normative sentence S contemplates, in the conditions of application of the norm N, the facts C1, C2, …and Cn; and if Cn is considered to be incompatible with the Constitution, the court may revise the sentence C by eliminating Cn from the set of the conditions of application of N." To quote an example, the Federal Supreme Court pronounced the unconstitutionality "with textual reduction" when a Federal Law regulating the activity of advocacy established that every advocate had "professional immunity" and thus "his speeches and manifestations in the exercise of his professional activities, either in or out of court", did not amount to the crimes of "injury, defamation 87 or contempt." It was held that this provision was unconstitutional while it immunized lawyers from being persecuted by the crime of contempt. The court held that if lawyers were excluded from the scope of the criminal provision which punishes the "contempt of court", the autonomy of the courts and the authority of their decisions would be seriously endangered, and therefore pronounced the unconstitutionality of the expression "and contempt", albeit keeping in force the rest of the 88 legislative provision. In the same case, many other provisions of the same statute were reduced in the same way, for the Court held that the advocates were immunized to such extent that these privileges could not find a justifying reason and violated, among others, the principle of equality before the 89 law.
A "pronouncement of partial unconstitutionality without textual reduction", in turn, takes place when the legislative provision violates the constitution if interpreted in its literal or ordinary meaning. The court interprets a particular expression of the statute in a restrictive way in order to eliminate from the abstract norm that can be derived from the wording of the provision any sense which would collide with the Constitution. Instead of a principle of constitutional interpretation, this is considered to be a principle for the interpretation of the infraconstitutional legislation. Its function is to preserve the presumption of legitimacy of the legislation while avoiding maintaining in force unconstitutional readings of a statute. without textual reduction" from the "interpretation in accordance with the constitution", from the pragmatic point of view there is no difference between the two of them. To use a Kelsenian category, we can say that in both cases the court eliminates from the "frame" which defines the possible meanings of a lower-level norm those meanings that would make it incompatible with the constitutional norm which provides the basis of its validity. Whenever it is semantically possible, the court should interpret an infraconstitutional norm in a way that avoids the annulment of such norm.
These methods of legal interpretation might, however, represent a threat to the accepted principle that the Court should always act as a negative legislator. When interpreting a statute "in accordance with the constitution", the court recognizes and reasserts that it is strictly forbidden to extend the scope of a legal provision in such a way that would create a general norm not established by the law-giver. As the court defines it, the interpretation "in accordance with the Constitution" is a "technique of constitutional review which can not lead to a particular interpretation that falls outside of the range of hermeneutic It is inadmissible to apply this interpretative method whenever it is impossible to choose, among the possible meanings of the infra-constitutional norm, one which would eliminate the unconstitutionality. One can not avoid the pronouncement of unconstitutionality when the meaning of the norm is 91 undisputed.
The temporal effects of the decisions on constitutional matters (on direct actions of unconstitutionality)
In Brazilian law, judges and courts generally consider themselves bound by the principle stated by Justice Marshall in Marbury vs. Madison: as a rule, unconstitutional laws are null and void and of 92 no effect. The influence of the early decisions from the Supreme Court of the United States over the development of judicial review in Brazil is remarkable, probably due to the influence of the ideas of one of the greatest Brazilian jurists of all times, Rui Barbosa, who was a strong voice in defense of the civil rights in the country and one of the architects of the historical model of 93 constitutional review.
As it was held in a relatively recent case, "the natural order of things" directs itself towards the view that a decision pronouncing the unconstitutionality of a norm retroacts to the date of the issuance of the 94 norm considered to be unconstitutional.
Had the law-giver not passed statutory provisions explicitly authorizing the Supreme Court to lay down manipulative decisions, probably there would still be some resistance from the community of jurists against decisions with merely ex nunc or prospective efficacy.
The current law is that decisions delivered in abstract and concentrated forms of judicial review of the constitutionality of laws normally have ex tunc or retroactive effects. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court may restrict the effects of the pronouncement of unconstitutionality of a law in order to deliver ex nunc or pro futuro decisions or even to determine that the pronouncement of unconstitutionality will produce effects only after a deadline to be set by the Court. The Court must comply with the following requisites while delivering such manipulative decisions: (i) there must be reasons of legal certainty or of (ii) exceptional social interest and, apart from that, (iii) the restriction or the exception to the retroactive efficacy of the decision must be established by a vote of at least two thirds of the 95 members of the Court (in its plenary sitting). There is no doubt, therefore, that manipulative decisions with regards to the temporal efficacy of the pronouncement of unconstitutionality of a law are admitted in the Brazilian legal system. Nevertheless, it is a consensus that the courts should manipulate the temporal effects of the decision of unconstitutionality not on the basis of purely pragmatic reasons, but rather on strictly juridical reasons.
The temporal effects of the decisions on constitutional matters (on diffused decisions on constitutional matters)
In spite of the lack of an express provision authorizing the courts to restrict the retrospective efficacy of the decisions of unconstitutionality in diffused and incidenter tantum judicial review, the Supreme Court has broadened the scope of the permission established by article 27 of Law number 9.868 of 19th November 1999. As a matter of fact, this provision, which authorizes the Court to limit the retrospective efficacy of decisions of unconstitutionality, is remarkably similar to the constitutional provision which, in the Portuguese 96 Republic, authorizes the same measures. The same order of questions that were raised in Portugal is now opened to the Brazilian debate. The court decided thus to rely on the doctrinal interpretation dominant in that country. In interpreting the Portuguese constitutional provision, Prof. Rui Medeiros claims that the article 282nd (4th) of the Portuguese Constitution applies not only to concentrated constitutional adjudication, but equally to diffused judicial decisions of 97 unconstitutionality of statutes.
In consonance with this view, there are some decisions of the Federal Supreme Court admitting decisions pronouncing the unconstitutionality of laws with purely prospective efficacy even in the diffused and concrete forms of constitutional 98 jurisdiction. The pronouncement of unconstitutionality in concrecto can be limited if "another constitutional principle justifies the denial of the application of the principle of nullity", that is, of the general rule that decisions of unconstitutionality 99 have retrospective efficacy.
In some exceptional cases, the Court has even admitted the so-called pronouncement of unconstitutionality without annulment of any concrete acts, on the grounds that the retrospective decision of unconstitutionality would itself violate the constitution to an extent even greater than would the maintenance of the unconstitutional acts (whose effects, in the particular case, could not be undone without serious losses to a large proportion 100 of the society).
Constitutional mutations
Constitutional mutations are also admitted in the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court. A "mutation" is understood as a change in the interpretation of a constitutional provision, the meaning of which is altered in spite of the maintenance of the same wording of the Constitution. If it were not for the binding efficacy of some constitutional decisions, there would be nothing special about "constitutional mutations" to distinguish them from the general practice of overruling. Because of the general effects of such changes, in some very exceptional cases the Court has applied the technique of "prospective overruling" in order to avoid retrospective changes 101 in the law that would cause social disruption. The general rule, however, is to avoid this technique and not to apply it unless there are very strong reasons advanced by the parties.
